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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT FINDS THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY INCLUDES 
THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE ONE’S SPOUSE, EVEN IN 
PRISON 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In recent years, the Supreme Court has continuously reiterated 
the importance of the right to marry, finding it to be a fundamental 
right protected by the Constitution. Activists across the nation have 
celebrated the Court’s continued protection of this fundamental right 
as it has expanded the rights of same-sex couples. What has received 
somewhat less attention is how the Court’s right-to-marry doctrine has 
affected a different segment of the population—prisoners. In the 
United States, there are currently 2.2 million people serving time in 
our nation’s prisons or jails.
1
 For many of us, prisoners are people we 
would rather not think about. These are individuals who have violated 
the laws of our society. However, these individuals have rights 
protected by the Constitution and that we cannot ignore.  
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, December 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois 
Institute of Technology. 
1
 THE SENTENCING PROJECT RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY FOR REFORM, 
INCARCERATION, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107 (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2016). 
1
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In its landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,
2
 the Supreme 
Court held that the right to marry is fundamental and includes the right 
to choose one’s spouse, even if that spouse is of the same sex.
3
 In 
Riker v. Lemmon,
4
 the Seventh Circuit recently faced a related 
question: does the right to marry—and choose one’s spouse—apply to 
prisoners?
5
 In a case dealing with factual circumstances that could be 
right out of the hit television show “Orange is the New Black,”
6
 the 
Seventh Circuit considered whether the right to marry, specifically the 
freedom to select a spouse, applies even to prisoners.
7
 The Seventh 
Circuit also examined the proper standard for reviewing any 
government policy that infringes on this fundamental right to marry.
8
  
Riker v. Lemmon involves a former prison employee who became 
romantically involved with a prisoner while employed at the prison.
9
 
The former employee quit her job after their romantic relationship was 
discovered, but she continued to correspond with the prisoner through 
letters and phone calls.
10
 The former employee later applied to be 
placed on the prisoner’s visitation list, but she was denied on the basis 
that prison policy forbids former employees from visiting prisoners at 
facilities where they worked if they began a relationship during their 
employment.
11
 The prisoner then submitted an application to marry the 
former employee, which was denied by the prison’s chaplain.
12
 The 
former employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
                                                 
2
 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
3
 Id. at 2598–99. 
4
 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015). 
5
 Id. at 555–56. 
6
 “Orange is the New Black” is a popular Netflix original series chronicling the 
lives of women as they serve sentences in a federal prison. See IMDB, ORANGE IS 
THE NEW BLACK, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2372162/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2015). 
7
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 555–56.  
8
 Id. at 551–54. 
9
 Id. at 548. 
10
 Id. at 548–49. 
11
 Id. at 549. 
12
 Id. 
2
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Southern District of Indiana, alleging that the denial of the marriage 
application was an unreasonable burden on her right to marry.
13
  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
prison, concluding that the burden on Ms. Riker’s right to marry was 
not substantial.
14
 The district court emphasized the fact that Ms. Riker 
was still free to marry a large portion of the population and was only 
prohibited from marrying Mr. Vest.
15
 In addition, the district court 
stressed that allowing Ms. Riker to visit inmates could pose a 
legitimate security risk as she was trained in Indiana Department of 
Corrections (IDOC) security protocols, and the court would not second 
guess the IDOC’s security concerns.
16
 
In reversing the district court’s ruling, the Seventh Circuit held 
that the right to marry includes the right to choose one’s spouse, even 
in prison, and thus, the prison’s denial of the former employee’s 
application to marry was an unreasonable burden on that right.
17
  
 
THE RIGHT TO MARRY AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
 
The Supreme Court has held certain liberties to be so important 
that they are deemed “fundamental rights,” which the government 
cannot infringe unless the high strict scrutiny standard is met.
18
 In 
order to meet the strict scrutiny standard, the government must 
demonstrate that its action is necessary to achieve a compelling 
purpose.
19
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Id. at 550. 
14
 Riker v. Lemmon, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *21 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 
2014), rev’d, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015). 
15
 Id. at *22. 
16
 Id. at *22–23. 
17
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 549–50. 
18
 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 812 
(Vicki Been et al., eds., 4th ed. 2011). 
19
 Id. 
3
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A.  Cases Defining the Right to Marry 
 
The Supreme Court recognized the right to marry as a 
fundamental right for the first time in Loving v. Virginia.
20
 In Loving, 
the Court struck down as unconstitutional a Virginia statute that 
prohibited a white person from marrying a person of any other race.
21
 
The Plaintiffs in the case were the Lovings, an interracial couple who 
were prosecuted for violating the statute.
22
 The Court held that the 
Virginia statute deprived the Lovings of their “constitutionally 
protected liberty without due process of law.”
23
 The Court avowed, 
“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital 
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men. Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to 
our very existence and survival.”
24
 The Court concluded that “[t]o 
deny this fundamental freedom . . . is surely to deprive all the State’s 
citizens of liberty without due process of law.”
25
 
The Supreme Court again visited the issue of the right to marry in 
Zablocki v. Redhail.
26
 Zablocki involved a Wisconsin statute which 
prevented individuals from marrying if they were behind on their child 
support payments.
27
 These individuals were required to obtain a court 
order granting permission to marry.
28
 A court order would be granted 
only if the individual could show proof that he or she had complied 
with their child support obligations.
29
 In Zablocki, the Court 
reaffirmed the right to marry as a fundamental right.
30
 While the Court 
                                                 
20
 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
21
 Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 818. 
22
 Id. at 818. 
23
 Id. at 819. 
24
 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
25
 Id. 
26
 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
27
 Id. at 375. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. at 386. 
4
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accepted that the state had a substantial interest in ensuring child 
support payments were paid, the Court found the law was not a 
sufficient means to accomplish that end.
31
 Thus, the statute violated 
the equal protection clause.
32
 
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the fundamental right 
to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges.
33
  In Obergefell, the petitioners 
challenged state laws in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee 
that defined marriage as between a man and a woman.
34
 The 
petitioners argued that these laws violated their constitutional right to 
marry.
35
 Relying on precedents including Loving and Zablocki, the 
Court stated that it had “long held the right to marry is protected by the 
Constitution.”
36
 The Court then concluded that same-sex couples must 
be able to exercise the right to marry.
37
 
 
B. The Right to Marry in Prison 
 
The Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of marriage in the 
prison context in Turner v. Safley.
38
 In Turner, prisoners challenged a 
marriage regulation that permitted them to marry only with permission 
from the prison superintendent.
39
 The superintendent would approve 
marriages only for compelling reasons.
40
 The Court emphasized the 
need “to formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional 
claims that is responsive both to the ‘policy of judicial restraint 
regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect 
                                                 
31
 Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 820. 
32
 Id. 
33
 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
34
 Id. at 2593. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. at 2598. 
37
 Id. 
38
 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
39
 Id. at 82. 
40
 Id. 
5
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constitutional rights.’”
41
 The standard articulated by the Court in 
Turner was “whether a prison regulation that burdens a fundamental 
right is reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives.”
42
  The 
court in Turner identified four factors to be considered in determining 
the reasonableness of a prison regulation restricting the right to marry: 
 
(1) whether a valid, rational connection exists between the 
regulation and a legitimate government interest behind the 
rule; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the 
right in question; (3) what impact accommodation of the 
asserted constitutional right would have on guards, other 
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) 
what easy alternatives exist to the regulation because, 
although the regulation need not satisfy a least restrictive 
alternatives test, the existence of obvious alternatives may be 
evidence that the regulation is not reasonable.
43
 
 
DISTRICT COURT DECISION OF RIKER V. LEMMON 
 
A.  Factual Background 
 
Rebecca Riker was employed by Aramark Correctional Services, 
Inc. (Aramark) from December 2007 until April 2008.
44
 As a 
contractor with the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC or the 
Department), Aramark was required to abide by IDOC’s policies and 
procedures.
45
 Ms. Riker worked at the Wabash Valley Correctional 
Facility, a prison facility that Aramark operated.
46
 The Wabash Valley 
Correctional Facility (WVCF) is a level-four maximum-security 
                                                 
41
 Id. at 85 (alteration in the original). 
42
 Id. at 87 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
43
 Id. 
44
 Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2015). 
45
 Riker v. Lemmon, No. 1:13-cv-00571-TWP-DML, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103558, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 2014). 
46
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 552. 
6
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correctional facility located in Carlisle, Indiana.
47
 Ms. Riker worked as 
a kitchen supervisor.
48
 In that capacity, she supervised roughly twenty 
inmates in preparing and serving meals.
49
 As a part of her job training, 
IDOC instructed Ms. Riker in “security, first aid, and personal 
protection skills.”
50
 In addition, she received “training on WVCF 
emergency security procedures, including procedures for evacuation, 
riots, bomb threats, escape prevention, security sweeps, hostage 
scenarios, and emergency transport.”
51
  
Ms. Riker met Paul Vest while working as his supervisor.
52
 Mr. 
Vest is an IDOC inmate serving a fifty-year sentence for robbery;
53
 his 
projected parole date is December 18, 2030.
54
 Mr. Vest and Ms. Riker 
began a romantic and physical relationship a few months after she 
started working at the prison.
55
 On multiple occasions, Mr. Vest and 
Ms. Riker kissed and had sexual intercourse in a walk-in cooler in the 
kitchen area.
56
 One day, a co-worker witnessed the two kissing and 
informed Ms. Riker that she had to report her.
57
 Ms. Riker left work 
that day and did not return to her employment at the prison.
58
   
After Ms. Riker left her job at the prison in April 2008 she 
continued to maintain contact with Mr. Vest.
59
 In May of 2008, she 
submitted an application to be placed on Mr. Vest’s visitor list.
60
 Her 
application was denied because she had previously worked at the 
                                                 
47
 Id.  
48
 Riker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *3. 
49
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 552. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Riker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *5–6. 
53
 Id. at *3. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. at *6. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2015). 
60
 Id. 
7
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facility.
61
 In 2008 and 2009, Ms. Riker wrote letters to prison officials, 
again requesting that she be placed on Mr. Vest’s visitor list.
62
 In 
support of her request, Ms. Riker pointed out that while she had 
worked at the facility, she was an employee of Aramark, a contractor.
63
 
Prison officials responded that prison policy prohibited former 
employees from visiting prisoners at the facility where they were 
previously employed.
64
 Ms. Riker was also informed of the appeal 
process for the denial of her application.
65
 In 2009, Mr. Vest submitted 
a request to marry Ms. Riker through the Religious Service 
Department.
66
 The prison chaplain denied Mr. Vest’s request because 
“Ms. Riker was not on Mr. Vest’s approved visitation list.”
67
 
Thereafter, Ms. Riker submitted multiple additional applications to 
visit Mr. Vest, which were also denied.
68
   
 
B.  The District Court’s Ruling 
 
In April 2013, Ms. Riker filed suit in the Southern District of 
Indiana against IDOC officials based on the denials of her requests to 
visit and marry Mr. Vest.
69
 The IDOC officials, in turn, moved for 
summary judgment arguing that “the Department’s refusal to permit 
Ms. Riker to marry Vest did not violate [Ms.] Riker’s qualified 
constitutional right to marry.”
70
  
The district court noted that Ms. Riker brought two causes of 
action based on the First Amendment.
71
 The first cause of action, 
                                                 
61
 Id. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Riker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *6. 
64
 Id. at *7. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id at *7–8. 
69
 Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2015). 
70
 Id. at 551 (alteration in the original) (internal quotations omitted).  
71
 Riker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *17. 
8
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Count I, was based on Ms. Riker’s right to associate with a prisoner—
Mr. Vest.
72
 The district court found that Ms. Riker’s complaint and 
summary judgment briefings failed to demonstrate any First 
Amendment expression that the Defendants had in some way 
limited.
73
 The second cause of action, Count II, was based on Ms. 
Riker’s right to an intimate association with Mr. Vest through 
marriage, which she asserted was based on the First Amendment.
74
 
However, as the district court noted, the right to form an intimate 
relationship is not analyzed under the First Amendment.
75
 The right to 
form an intimate relationship, such as marriage, is analyzed as a 
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, which Ms. Riker alleged 
in Count III.
76
 
In analyzing Ms. Riker’s right to marry claim, the district court 
relied on the standard articulated in Zablocki.
77
 The Zablocki standard 
requires a two part inquiry: “if the challenged policy imposes a direct 
and substantial burden on an intimate relationship, it is subject to strict 
scrutiny; if the policy does not impose a direct and substantial burden, 
it is subject only to rational basis review.”
78
 Here, the district court 
found “that the burden on Ms. Riker’s right to marry was not 
substantial or direct,” but was moderate at best.
79
 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court relied on the fact that Ms. Riker herself had not 
made a formal request to marry Mr. Vest.
80
 The court also relied on a 
Sixth Circuit case that defined a direct and substantial burden as one 
where either a large percentage of the individuals affected “are 
absolutely or largely prevented from marrying” or the individuals 
                                                 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. at *18. 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. at *19. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. at *19–20. 
78
 Id. at *20 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–87 (1978); 
Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
79
 Id. at *21. 
80
 Id. 
9
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affected “are absolutely or largely prevented from marrying a large 
portion of the otherwise eligible population of spouses.”
81
 The court 
concluded that the burden on Ms. Riker’s right to marry was not 
substantial because she was not prevented from marrying a large 
portion of the eligible population of potential spouses.
82
 Thus, the 
district court applied only a rational basis standard of review in 
analyzing the IDOC’s policies at issue in this case.
83
 
Applying rational basis review, the district court first noted that 
the Defendants’ argued “legitimate penological interests” supported 
the policies.
84
 The IDOC argued that since Ms. Riker was trained in its 
security protocols, allowing her, or any other former employee, to visit 
an inmate would create “legitimate security risks.”
85
 In addition, the 
IDOC also argued that Ms. Riker had already violated prison policies 
by engaging in a sexual relationship with an inmate while employed at 
the prison.
86
 The court found these rationales sufficient to pass rational 
basis review, and refused to “second guess the security concerns 
expressed by the correctional authorities.”
87
 Based on the foregoing, 
the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
88
 
Ms. Riker appealed the lower court’s decision.
89
 Ms. Riker’s 
appeal related only to “the district court’s decision that the defendants 
did not unreasonably burden her constitutional right to marry.”
90
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81
 Id. at *22–23 (citing Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1040 (6th Cir. 
2003)). 
82
 Id. at *22. 
83
 Id. at *23. 
84
 Id. at *22. 
85
 Id. at *22–23. 
86
 Id. at *23. 
87
 Id. 
88
 Id. 
89
 See Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015). 
90
 Id. at 550. 
10
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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN RIKER V. LEMMON 
 
A.  Prior Seventh Circuit Cases Involving the Right to 
 Marry in Prison 
 
The Seventh Circuit has previously addressed the issue of the 
right to marry in the prison context in Keeney v. Heath
91
 and Martin v. 
Snyder.
92
 
In Keeney, the plaintiff was a guard at the prison who became 
acquainted with one of the prisoners.
93
 A supervisor at the jail became 
suspicious that the two were romantically involved and had the 
prisoner transferred to a different facility.
94
 The two began a 
correspondence, and the guard began to frequently visit the prisoner.
95
 
The supervisor who had transferred the prisoner asked the guard about 
her relationship with the prisoner.
96
 The guard admitted that she was in 
a relationship with the prisoner and planned to marry him.
97
 The 
supervisor told the guard that she either had to stop her relationship 
with the prisoner or quit her job because of a prison regulation that 
prohibited employees from being socially involved with prisoners 
either inside or outside of the prison.
98
 The guard resigned from her 
position and married the prisoner the following year.
99
 The guard filed 
suit alleging that the defendants violated her constitutional right to 
marry by forcing her to choose between her job and marrying the man 
                                                 
91
 57 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 1995). 
92
 329 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2003) 
93
 Keeney, 57 F.3d at 580. 
94
 Id. 
95
 Id. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id.  
99
 Id. 
11
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of her choice.
100
 The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the prison and the plaintiff appealed.
101
 
The Seventh Circuit noted that while the defendants did not 
outright forbid the plaintiff from marrying the prisoner, they made it 
costly for her to do so, which was undoubtedly a burden on her right to 
marry.
102
 Thus, the court stated that the defendants could impose such 
a burden, but only if they articulated some justification for doing so.
103
 
The court emphasized that this justification need not be as strong as if 
they were forbidding marriage as in the Turner case.
104
 In its opinion, 
the court stressed that “[j]udges should be cautious about disparaging 
disciplinary and security concerns expressed by the correctional 
authorities.”
105
 Therefore, courts should not interfere “[a]s long as the 
concerns expressed by correctional authorities are plausible, and the 
burden that a challenged regulation of jail or prison security places on 
protected rights a light or moderate one.”
106
 In Keeney, the court found 
that the burden on the right to marry was not substantial, but light or 
moderate at most, and thus, the prison did not violate the plaintiff’s 
constitutional right to marry.
107
  
The Seventh Circuit once again confronted the issue of how the 
fundamental right to marry applies in the prison context in Martin v. 
Snyder.
108
 In Martin, the prisoner’s visitation privileges were 
suspended for thirty days after an incident where the prisoner touched 
his girlfriend’s buttock during a visit at the prison.
109
 The prisoner’s 
girlfriend was also placed on a restricted list for an unspecified period 
                                                 
100
 Id. 
101
 Id. 
102
 Id. 
103
 Id. 
104
 Id. at 580–81. 
105
 Id. at 581. 
106
 Id. 
107
 Id. 
108
 329 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2003). 
109
 Id. at 920. 
12
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of time.
110
 Around six months or so later, the prisoner and his 
girlfriend requested permission to marry from the warden.
111
 Their 
request was denied because the prisoner’s girlfriend was not, at that 
time, permitted to visit the prisoner.
112
 They filed suit alleging that the 
prison violated their constitutional right to marry by preventing the 
couple from being able to see and marry each other.
113
 The district 
court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, concluding that 
although prisoners have a fundamental right to marry, prisons can 
restrict this right if there are valid penological reasons for doing so.
114
 
The court held that violating a prison rule was an acceptable 
justification for barring a marriage.
115
 
In upholding the district court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit 
emphasized that while the complaint alleged the couple was denied the 
ability to marry, the warden did not prevent their marriage, he merely 
postponed it.
116
 Therefore, the court held that “[r]estrictions on 
visitation, though not enough to justify prohibiting marriage, may well 
justify deferment, so that the sanction for misconduct will have some 
sting.”
117
  
 
B.  The Seventh’s Circuit Opinion in Riker v. Lemmon 
 
In Riker v. Lemmon, the Seventh Circuit once again addressed the 
complexities in analyzing the application of the fundamental right to 
marry in prisons.
118
 In an opinion authored by Judge Ripple, the court 
began by stressing that “courts must take cognizance of the valid 
constitutional claims of prison inmates” because “[p]rison walls do not 
                                                 
110
 Id. 
111
 Id. 
112
 Id. 
113
 Id. 
114
 Id. 
115
 Id. 
116
 Id. at 921–22. 
117
 Id. at 922. 
118
 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015). 
13
Wright: The Seventh Circuit Finds the Fundamental Right to Marry Includes
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 11, Issue 1                            Fall 2015 
 
49 
 
form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution.”
119
 The court also noted that while a prisoner’s 
fundamental right to marry is protected by the Constitution, this right 
is subject to considerable restrictions.
120
 The court then articulated the 
standard set forth in Turner for analyzing constitutional claims by 
prisoners, “a prison regulation [that] impinges on inmates’ 
constitutional rights . . . is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”
121
 To determine whether a regulation is 
reasonable, the court must “balance the constitutional right asserted 
against the legitimate penological goals of the prison.”
122
 Although 
Ms. Riker is not a prisoner, the standard is the same for all challenges 
to prison regulations as violating constitutional rights whether the 
rights of prisoners or non-prisoners are at issue.
123
 The court then 
reiterated the four factors articulated in Turner for determining if a 
prison regulation that restricts the right to marry is reasonable: (1) 
whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation 
and a legitimate government interest, (2) whether any alternative 
means of exercising the right are available, (3) what impact 
accommodating the right would have, (4) the existence of easy 
alternatives to the regulation.
124
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit Correctly Found That the Fundamental 
Right to Marry Includes the Right to Select One’s Spouse, Even 
in Prison 
 
The IDOC argued that its denial of Ms. Riker’s marriage 
application did not infringe on Ms. Ricker’s right to marry because she 
                                                 
119
 Id. at 551 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
120
 Id. 
121
 Id. 
122
 Id. at 552. 
123
 Id. 
124
 Id. 
14
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was free to marry anyone but Mr. Vest.
125
 The district court agreed 
with the Department, finding that the burden on Ms. Ricker’s right to 
marry was not substantial or direct because she had not been prevented 
from marrying a large portion of the population.
126
 However, as the 
Seventh Circuit was quick to note, this argument can be readily 
dismissed.
127
 Relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell, 
the Seventh Circuit found, “the right to marry includes the right to 
select one’s spouse.”
128
 In Obergefell, the Court held that the right to 
marry is fundamental, and “the right to personal choice regarding 
marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”
129
 
Although “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison 
inmates from the protections of the Constitution,”
130
 they are subject 
to substantial restrictions.
131
 However, as the Seventh Circuit noted, 
the district court’s analysis should have focused on whether the prison 
regulation prevented Ms. Riker from marrying Mr. Vest was an 
unreasonable burden. The district court’s analysis should not have 
considered whether Ms. Riker was free to marry other members of 
society. 
 
B.  The Seventh Circuit Failed to Properly Acknowledge the IDOC’s 
Security-Related Justifications and Should Have Focused on the 
Existence of Alternatives to the Regulation 
 
The Seventh Circuit failed to adequately acknowledge the IDOC’s 
security related justifications for the regulation, and the court should 
not have cast aside these concerns so readily. The IDOC also argued 
that its decision to deny Ms. Riker’s request to marry Mr. Vest was in 
                                                 
125
 Id. at *20. 
126
 Riker v. Lemmon, No. 1:13-cv-00571-TWP-DML, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103558, at *21 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 2014). 
127
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 555-56.  
128
 Id. 
129
 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
130
 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
131
 Id. at 95. 
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furtherance of its “legitimate interest in maintaining security and 
institutional order.”
132
 In support of this argument, the Department 
provided two “security-related justifications” for its decision.
133
 First, 
the Department maintained that former employees previously found to 
have violated Department policies are “more likely to engage in other 
prohibited acts.”
134
 Ms. Riker had already violated IDOC policies by 
beginning a relationship with a prisoner while employed at the 
prison.
135
 The risks associated with the tendency for individuals to 
take drastic actions on behalf of someone they love can be catastrophic 
in the prison environment. The massive manhunt that occurred during 
the summer of 2015, after two inmates escaped with help from a 
prison employee, who was involved in a relationship with one of the 
inmates, demonstrates the serious consequences of inappropriate 
relationships between prison employees and prisoners.
136
 Second, the 
Department argued that a former employee could share confidential 
information obtained during their employment at the prison with an 
inmate.
137
 Concerns regarding a prison employee, or former employee, 
sharing confidential information with an inmate are heightened if the 
individuals are, or become, married because the marital 
communications privilege protects confidential communications 
between spouses from compelled disclosure.
138
 In evaluating the 
IDOC’s security-related justifications for its regulation, the Seventh 
Circuit considered whether the Department’s decision to prevent Ms. 
Ricker from marrying Mr. Vest “was reasonably related to its 
                                                 
132
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 549–50. 
133
 Id. 
134
 Id. 
135
 Id. 
136
 See Jesse McKinley, Prison Worker Who Aided Escape Tells of Sex, Saw 
Blades and Deception, NEW YORK TIMES (July 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/nyregion/prison-worker-who-aided-escape-
tells-of-sexual-favors-saw-blades-and-deceit.html?_r=0. 
137
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 549–50. 
138
 Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934). 
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legitimate penological interests.”
139
 The Department’s security-related 
justifications should not be hastily dismissed.  
The Seventh Circuit concluded that because Ms. Riker is only 
seeking a one-time visit to the prison, the burden on her fundamental 
right to marry is significant and unconstitutional.
140
 Ignoring the 
factual record from the district court proceedings, the Seventh Circuit 
criticized the Department’s position as equating “Ms. Riker’s one-time 
request to enter the prison to participate in a marriage ceremony with a 
request for general visitation rights.”
141
 The court simply cast aside the 
Department’s contention that “the same security principles and 
concerns apply to the consideration of [Ms.] Riker’s request for 
marriage as it does her request for visitation.”
142
 The IDOC relied on 
the same security related justifications in defending both its visitation 
and marriage policies.
143
 Although on appeal Ms. Riker argued that 
she sought only a single visit to the prison for the sole purpose of 
marrying her fiancé,
144
 the record below does not support Ms. Riker’s 
contention that her request was so limited. On the contrary, the record 
below indicated that Ms. Riker submitted multiple requests to be 
placed on Mr. Vest’s visitor’s list.
145
  The Seventh Circuit relied on 
Martin v. Snyder,
146
 another case in which the Court considered the 
right to marry in the prison context.
147
 In Martin, the prison’s 
visitation privileges were revoked after he fondled his girlfriend 
during a visit at the prison.
148
 While the prisoner’s girlfriend was still 
on his restricted visitation list, the prisoner requested permission to 
                                                 
139
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 556–57. 
140
 Id. at 554. 
141
 Id. 
142
 Id. at 550–51 (alterations in the original). 
143
 Id. at 550. 
144
 Id. at 551–52. 
145
 Riker v. Lemmon, No. 1:13-cv-00571-TWP-DML, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103558, at *6–7 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 2014).  
146
 Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 2003). 
147
 Id. 
148
 Id. 
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marry her.
149
 The request was denied because the prisoner’s girlfriend 
was not allowed to visit the prisoner.
150
 Relying on Martin, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded, “a prison’s visitation policy, on its own, 
does not justify prohibiting an inmate’s marriage.”
151
 However, the 
Department did not rely solely on its visitation policy in denying Ms. 
Riker’s request for marriage. IDOC policies clearly indicate that a 
request for marriage may be denied because “[t]he offender is 
requesting to marry either a staff member or former staff member of 
the department,” or “[t]he requested marriage would endanger the 
safety and security of the facility, the department, the individuals or 
the public.”
152
  Although the court emphasized that the denials of Ms. 
Riker’s marriage applications did not reference the Department’s 
marriage policy,
153
 the Department argued that the same security 
justifications support both its visitation and marriage policies.
154
 
The Department cited specific security concerns that would result 
if a former employee were allowed to visit an inmate with whom they 
developed an inappropriate relationship during their employment.
155
 
Ms. Riker was “trained by the [IDOC] in security protocols, defense, 
and emergency security procedures” and might divulge such 
information to Mr. Vest “or assist him in other inappropriate ways.”
156
 
The Department also maintained that prohibiting Ms. Riker’s marriage 
served as a deterrent to other employees.
157
 It is this kind of second-
guessing by courts of policies implemented by prison administrators 
that previous precedents cautioned against. The Seventh Circuit “must 
accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison 
administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the 
                                                 
149
 Id. 
150
 Id. 
151
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 557.  
152
 Id. at 550 n.11. 
153
 Id. at 550–51. 
154
 Id. 
155
 Id. 
156
 Id.  
157
 Id. at 557. 
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legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most 
appropriate means to accomplish them.”
158
 A statement by the Seventh 
Circuit that the prison officials did not demonstrate that they used their 
professional judgment in denying Ms. Riker’s marriage request is not 
sufficient.
159
 It is unclear how the court could possibly come to the 
conclusion that the prison officials did not use their professional 
judgment in drafting and implementing the policies relating to the 
visitation and marriage of formers employees to inmates at the prison. 
The Seventh Circuit relied almost entirely on the first factor of the 
Turner test in reaching its conclusion. Near the end of its conclusion, 
the court once again missed the point by emphasizing that “the record 
does not reveal why prison officials would have difficulty monitoring 
the marriage ceremony to ensure that Ms. Riker does not violate prison 
regulations or relay sensitive information to Vest.”
160
 The record does 
not reveal such difficulties because Ms. Riker raised this argument—
that she seeks only a short marriage ceremony—for the first time on 
appeal. If the Department were to consider Ms. Riker’s request as a 
general request for the marriage, and all its benefits including 
visitations, a lengthier discussion regarding the other factors in the 
Turner test would be necessary. The second factor in the Turner 
standard is “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right 
that remain open to prison inmates.”
161
 Here, there are no alternative 
means available for Ms. Riker and Mr. Vest to exercise their right to 
marry.  
The third factor is “the impact accommodation of the asserted 
constitutional right would have on guards, other inmates, and on 
allocation of prison resources generally.”
162
 The Seventh Circuit 
briefly addressed this factor, but focused its discussion solely on the 
impact of allowing Ms. Riker and Mr. Vest to have a brief one-time 
                                                 
158
 Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Overton v. 
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003)).  
159
 See Riker, 798 F.3d at 557–58, 558 n.30. 
160
 Id. at 557. 
161
 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 80 (1987). 
162
 Id. 
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marriage ceremony at the prison.
163
 In its discussion, the court noted 
“the record does not reveal why prison officials would have difficulty 
monitoring the marriage ceremony to ensure that Ms. Riker does not 
violate prison regulations or relay sensitive information to Vest.”
164
 
However, as noted supra, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Ms. 
Riker’s contention that she seeks only a brief one-time visit to the 
prison for the purpose of holding a marriage ceremony is misplaced. 
Ms. Riker did not make such a limited argument in her case before the 
district court below,
165
 and ignored the possibility that Ms. Riker and 
Mr. Vest would seek other marital benefits after the marriage 
ceremony. Thus, it is necessary to consider the impact of 
accommodating Ms. Riker’s general request to marry Mr. Vest, and the 
accompanying martial benefits—including visitation. Accommodating 
Ms. Riker’s general request for marriage would have a greater impact 
on the guards, other inmates, and prison resources. Allowing Ms. 
Riker, a former employee of the prison who has knowledge of the 
IDOC’s security protocols, to marry Vest could endanger the prison’s 
guards and make it more difficult for them to maintain security and 
order in the prison. Granting Ms. Riker’s request to marry Vest could 
also impact the other inmates housed at the facility, and it might lead 
other inmates to attempt to engage in inappropriate relationships with 
prison staff. 
Finally, the last factor in the Turner standard is the existence, or 
absence, of easy alternatives to the regulation at issue.
166
 The Court in 
Turner found that “if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative 
that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to 
valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that 
the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.”
167
 
The Seventh Circuit briefly addressed this issue as well, but once 
                                                 
163
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 557–58. 
164
 Id. 
165
 Riker v. Lemmon, No. 1:13-cv-00571-TWP-DML, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103558, at *6–8 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 2014). 
166
 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987). 
167
 Id. at 91. 
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again relied on Ms. Riker’s insistence that she sought only a brief 
marriage ceremony.
168
 The court stated that the IDOC offered no 
justification for why it could not grant Ms. Riker’s marriage request 
while still maintaining the security of its facility.
169
 Therefore, the 
court found it implausible “that a brief marriage ceremony [could not] 
be accommodated without threatening institutional security and 
without imposing more than a de minimis impact on prison 
resources.”
170
 However, once again, the Seventh Circuit’s 
determination that Ms. Riker sought to return to the prison only to 
participate in a brief marriage ceremony is erroneous. The court’s 
analysis should have focused on whether there were easy alternatives 
to the IDOC’s regulation that prohibited former employees from 
marrying—or visiting—inmates housed at the same facility. 
The fact that easy alternatives exist that would allow Ms. Riker to 
marry Mr. Vest demonstrates that the IDOC’s regulation is not 
reasonable. Here, although the IDOC’s regulation prohibiting former 
employees from engaging in relationships with prisoners at the same 
facility where they are employed serves a valid penological interest, 
the IDOC could allow for individuals who may become involved in 
these relationships to transfer facilities in order to alleviate any 
security related concerns. The IDOC could have transferred Mr. Vest 
to a different prison facility in order to allow Ms. Riker and Mr. Vest 
to become married. Transferring Mr. Vest to a different facility would 
alleviate any security related concerns because Ms. Riker would not 
have the same level of knowledge regarding the procedures at a 
different facility. Moreover, the transfer of prisons occurs quite 
frequently and would result is de minimis cost for the prison.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
168
 Riker, 798 F.3d at 557–58. 
169
 Id. at 557. 
170
 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s holding requires the prison to show more 
than is required under the standard articulated in Turner.
171
 Indeed, 
according to Turner, there must be a valid, rational connection 
between the regulation and a legitimate government interest behind the 
rule.
172
 The prison has maintained rational security concerns related to 
Ms. Riker’s requests for visitation and marriage. However, the prison 
has an alternative means of allowing Ms. Riker to exercise her right to 
marry while at the same time protecting the security interest of the 
prison. The prison could transfer Mr. Vest to another prison facility 
where Ms. Riker was never employed, which would alleviate any 
security related concerns while still allowing Ms. Riker to exercise her 
right to marry the spouse of her choosing. 
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172
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